



Auditing Network Architecture

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Agenda

- Understand the components when auditing network architecture
- Look at some of the key components in the network architecture



Network Diagrams

- Logical diagram
 - Systems and protocols being utilized
 - Flow of information
 - VLAN and logical network separation is identified
 - Physical diagram
 - Identify what ports plug into which devices
 - Essential for identifying defensive strategies and protecting connections
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APT Life Cycle

Can you figure out how a break occurred and the extent?

Have you audited your controls?

Can you see what's happening on your network?




What are your targets?

Are your users the weakest link?

Diagram Source:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_persistent_threat

Layered Security Throughout the Environment





Segmentation and Isolation

- Helps to contain breaches
 - You are adding perimeters through the network
 - Create security zones
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Defense-in-Depth

- Always remember DID!
 - All audits must consider the “Big Picture”
 - Many components make up a network’s defenses
 - Perimeter routers
 - Perimeter firewalls
 - Internal routers
 - Internal firewalls
 - Network-based IDS/IPS
 - Host-based IDS/IPS
 - NAC
 - Application Whitelisting
 - Policies and procedures
 - Advanced Malware Protection
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Firewall Rulebase Principles

- A "default deny" policy should exist
 - The last rule should be deny everything, and should log any traffic that is processed by the rule
 - Rules should be specific
 - Rule should not allow access from any source or from a source network address
 - Rules should not allow access to any destination or to a destination network address
 - Rules should not allow access to any destination port or a large range of destination ports
 - Rules should not overlap or duplicate each other
 - Rules should not contradict other rule
 - Rules should be utilized
 - Disabled or unused rules should not exist as they make the rulebase more complicated
 - Services should be secured
 - No clear text protocols should be allowed
 - Dangerous services should not be allowed
 - Logging should occur for all rules
 - All rules should have a business justification
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Next Generation Firewalls

- Goes beyond basic filtering
 - Basic filtering is the typical Protocol, source IP, destination IP, source port/process, destination port/process
 - Filter at the application layer
 - Beyond packet inspection to application control
 - As security “features” are enabled, throughput drops
 - Ex. Integrated IPS, External intelligence sources, decryption and protocol decoders, etc.
 - Not all NGFWs are the same!
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NextGen Filtering Examples

- Source
 - Ex. Device type, authentication type or Active Directory user
 - Destination
 - FQDNs
 - Application filtering, not just service filtering
 - Action may be encrypt/decrypt, DLP, filter, etc.
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Next Generation Capabilities

- Make decisions based on applications, not ports
 - Application signatures
 - Identify users, not IP addresses
 - Login and user activity monitoring, etc.
 - Inspect payload and content, not just headers
 - Malware
 - Attack traffic
 - URL filtering
 - Blocking certain file types
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IDS/IPS Detection

- Signature-based Detection: patterns that correspond to a known threat
 - Anomaly-based Detection: comparing definitions of what activity is considered normal against observed events to identify significant deviations
 - Stateful Protocol Analysis: comparing predetermined profiles of generally accepted definitions of benign protocol activity for each protocol state against observed events to identify deviations
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Host-Based

- Advantages
 - Verify success or failure of an attack
 - Monitor specific system activities
 - Detect attacks that are not identified by network-based systems
 - Ex. From a keyboard
 - Well-suited for encrypted and switched environments
 - Near real-time detection and response
 - Do not require additional hardware
 - Lower cost
 - Disadvantages
 - Capabilities are compromised as soon as the host machine is compromised
 - Additional overhead to the OS
 - Must exist on each individual system
 - Application-specific
 - Can not monitor attacks that target multiple hosts
 - Often have difficulty detecting and operating during denial-of-service attacks
 - Parasitic software
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Network-Based

- Advantages
 - Stealthy
 - No effect on existing systems or infrastructure when deployed
 - OS independent
 - Capabilities are not compromised when a host is compromised
 - No additional overhead to the OS
 - Can monitor multiple systems
 - Disadvantages
 - Not very scalable
 - Based on predefined attack signatures
 - Can not monitor "on host" activity
 - Can not monitor encrypted traffic easily or without taking up significant resources
 - Additional hardware required
 - Higher cost
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Checklist for IDS/IPS

- Are zones created and identify with appropriate controls?
- Does architectural placement make sense?
- How is traffic being captured – hub, switch, etc.?
- Technical Validation
 - Verify port scan detection
 - Multiple speeds
 - Verify payload detection
 - Verify fragmentation identification
- Are signatures up to date? How often do updates occur?
- Is the notification or alerting system used?
- Are logs being reviewed? Centralized?
- What traffic is/is not being monitored? Encrypted traffic? “Blind” network segments?
- Is NTP configured?
- Where is the management interface accessible from?



What is HIPS?

- Host is responsible for protecting itself
 - Addresses switching & encryption issues
 - Potential for lower false positives
- Can protect exposed services
 - Unexpected data formats
 - Zero-day and APT
 - Learning mode makes this easier
 - Should be a smaller curve than NIPS
 - More accurate info to work with



HIPS Deployment

- Any server with Internet facing services
- High asset/critical resources
- Users with a high level of network access
- Potentially useful on any system with Internet access



Does HIPS Fix Everything?

- Good for securing exposed applications
- May not be able to generate a whitelist for every application in all cases
- Sometimes it's sufficient to simply identify if an application should be permitted to execute
 - App does not interface with the network
- Application control or application whitelisting can be extremely useful when looking at applications



Application Control

- Control of software running on an end system
 - Whitelisting of applications
 - Permits enforcement of “acceptable use” policy regarding software
 - A good system can also augment
 - License monitoring
 - Track source of individual files
 - Tracing back rogue software
 - Assist in troubleshooting
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Application Control Provides


- Blocking the infection of malware
 - AV only finds malware we know about
 - Enforcing acceptable use policy
 - No more blocking at the border
 - Maintain the system in a corporate approved state
 - Same concept as “default allow” versus “default deny” for firewalls
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Whitelisting Deployment

- Mobile users
 - Desktops with Internet access
 - “Problem” users
 - Publicly accessible systems
 - When data integrity needs to be maintained
 - File database is the “backbone”
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Attackers Have Changed





Endpoint Threat Protection & Response

- Detection
 - Monitor in real-time
 - Conduct behavior analysis
 - Predict attacks without signatures
 - Identify abnormal activity
 - Integrate threat intelligence – learn from others
 - Response
 - Record activity on endpoints
 - Contain threats
 - Investigate threats
 - Remediate and adjust based on results
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Detection versus Discovery

- Attacks are often detected
 - They are a in log *somewhere*!
- Discovery is often missed
 - Out of the millions of log entries I have, how do I find the one that's a problem?



Evaluating Endpoint Threat Detection and Response

- User impact
 - Continuous monitoring
 - Centralized storage
 - Threat intelligence
 - Prevent untrusted software
 - Integrate with other security devices
 - Facilitate a quick response
 - Platforms covered
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Data Loss Prevention (DLP)

- Prevent the leakage of sensitive information
 - Credit card information
 - Medical records
 - Social security numbers
 - Some customizable options
 - Wikileaks document releases has really brought attention to this industry
 - Being adopted by many regulatory standards
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DLP Deficiencies

- Regular expressions are simple pattern matching
 - Change the pattern and the data goes undetected
 - Simple encryption
 - Stenography
 - Working with RegX is a steep learning curve
 - Network based rarely checks all ports
 - Host based requires (yet another) agent
 - Can cause noticeable degradation in performance
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Advanced Malware Protection

- Understand the Problem
 - Look at the adversary
 - Look at Advanced Malware Protection
 - Sandboxing
 - Overview of solutions including Cuckoo and FireEye
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Methods of Evaluation

- IP address blacklisting
 - File activity
 - Type, protocol and direction of file transfers
 - Further, more in depth evaluation
 - Sandboxing
 - Lookups in the cloud
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Summary

- Discussed the components when auditing network architecture
- Reviewed some of the key components in the network architecture



Courses Available

- SANS Sec502: Perimeter Protection In-Depth
 - June 15-June 20, 2015
 - <http://www.sans.org/event/sansfire-2015/course/perimeter-protection-in-depth>
 - Auditing Network Security in Dallas, TX
 - April 27-29, 2015
 - Auditing Active Directory and Windows in Dallas, TX
 - May 18-20, 2015
 - Foundations of IT Auditing in Dallas, TX
 - June 23-25, 2015
 - Auditing UNIX/Linux in Dallas, TX
 - July 9-10, 2015
 - Auditing Oracle in Dallas, TX
 - September 21-23, 2015
 - Auditing Web Applications

 - See www.securityaudits.org/events.html for more information and to register
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Thank you!

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